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Abstract 
Participants in cognitive psychology experiments on reasoning and 
problem solving are commonly sequestered: Efforts are made to impoverish 
the physical context in which the problem is presented, decoupling people 
from the richer and modifiable environment that naturally instantiates it 
outside the lab. Sense-making activities are constrained, but this conforms to 
the strong internalist and individualist commitments implicit to these research 
efforts: Cognition reflects internal computations and the scientists’ toils must 
focus on the individual and what she is thinking, decoupled from the world. 
We contrast this position with one that identifies cognition as the product of a 
cognitive system that is configured and enacted by, minimally, an agent and 
the world in which she is embedded. We review work on the psychology of 
hypothesis testing and problem solving and argue that refocusing research 
efforts on the dynamic agent-environment couplings that generate cognitive 
products—such as a problem representation, a hypothesis or a problem 
solution—offer a much richer set of methodological opportunities to unveil 
how people actually think outside the cognitive psychologist’s laboratory. We 
conclude by exploring the ontological implications of a systemic perspective 
on cognition.  
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Diagrams, Jars, and Matchsticks: A Systemicist’s Toolkit 
 
Isolating an individual in an artificial laboratory environment to better 
examine the cognitive processes implicated in a carefully crafted task reflects 
a commitment to methodological sequestering (cf. Bolland, 2011). The 
sequestering is considered essential for the scientific conduct of the 
enterprise in the same way that much of biology and chemistry is conducted 
under laboratory conditions: to isolate, control, parse, and generally reduce 
the complexity of multiply-determined and dynamic phenomena to fit the 
scientist’s measuring instruments and formal models. The resulting window 
onto cognition throws up data, analysed, scrutinized and replicated. These 
data advance our understanding of human cognition to the extent that the 
crafty task that elicited them captures some essential feature of human 
cognition once the participant is released from the laboratory and allowed to 
roam free in the wild, as it were. This methodological commitment is often 
coupled to another one, namely methodological individualism: The unit of 
analysis is the individual and performance elicited from the crafty laboratory 
task is a reflection of her internal capacities and abilities (cf. Malafouris, 2013, 
p. 25). In social psychology, attribution theorists speak of a fundamental 
attribution error: observers’ tendency to attribute the cause of an actor’s 
behavior to internal disposition and “underestimate the potential impact of 
relevant environmental forces and constraints” (Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 
1977, p. 492). These methodological commitments make it impossible—by 
the very nature of the science that is conducted under their auspices—to 
understand cognition from a systemic perspective, as reflecting a coalition of 
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internal and external resources. It is exactly this coalitional perspective that 
will be explored in this paper, and the aim will be to illustrate how much richer, 
and arguably more representative, a characterization of human cognition is 
possible as a result. 
The paper is structured in three sections. In the first we explore the 
psychology of hypothesis testing as illustrated on the basis of performance in 
a celebrated rule discover task, namely Wason’s (1960) 2-4-6 task. The 
unflattering performance profiled with this task has generally puzzled 
psychologists, and most have sought to identify the cognitive and personality 
features of the minority who solve the task to shed light on why so few do. We 
demonstrate, in contrast, that a focus on the physical context of the problem, 
and the representational richness it proffers, casts a more productive—and 
kinder—light on people’s hypothesis testing behaviour. In the next section, we 
review recent work on the psychology of mental set and insight that explored 
the role of interactivity with the physical components of a problem situation in 
fostering more creative problem solving behaviour. The paper closes by 
outlining the methodological and ontological implications of casting reasoning 
as the product of singular cognitive ecosystems. 
Hypothesis Testing and Discovery 
Evans (in press) reviewed the past 50 years of research on hypothesis 
testing and discovery driven by Wason’s (1960) simple concept attainment 
task, the 2-4-6 task. In this task participants must discover a rule that governs 
how three numbers are put together: They do so by generating new 
sequences of three numbers for which they receive feedback. On the basis of 
this feedback participants gain information and test new sequences until they 
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are sufficiently confident to announce the rule. To start things off, the 
experimenter offers a number sequence that conforms to the to-be-discovered 
rule: 2-4-6. The features of this initial example lure participants to contemplate 
hypotheses such as even numbers increasing by a constant or some specific 
arithmetic operation (e.g., such as the third number is the sum of the first two): 
yet the target rule is ‘any increasing sequence’. The initial triple suggests rules 
that are a subset of a more general rule; as long as the sequences go up, the 
feedback will be positive. A positive test strategy where participants offer 
positive instances of their current hypothesis—e.g., current hypothesis is 
‘evens increasing by 2’, and the sequence offered is ‘10-12-14’—will result in 
positive feedback. However, in this task, positive feedback shores up the 
sufficiency of the hypothesis, it does not test its necessity. The abundance of 
positive feedback, coupled with a positive test strategy make the target rule 
very difficult to discover. As Wason (1960) and many subsequent replications 
demonstrated (e.g., Gale & Ball, 2006) only about 20% of the participants 
discover the ascending number rule. 
Wason designed this task to determine the degree to which people 
would naturally seek to falsify their hypothesis, very much in the spirit of the 
kind of epistemology promoted by Popper at the time (the English translation 
of Logik der Forschung was published in 1959): In essence, to examine the 
willingness of reasoners to entertain counterfactual hypotheses and predict 
what could happen if their pet hypothesis was false. A more important 
question perhaps is whether the 2-4-6 task is representative of inductive 
reasoning and hypothesis testing, that is whether one can learn anything 
about inductive reasoning by using this task. As lab tasks go, its structure and 
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content are far removed from scientific hypothesis testing, and probably from 
a wide range of more quotidian efforts. However, as in the world outside the 
lab, reasoners are asked to determine the scope and truth of a hypothesis, 
and in that way that task offers an interesting mean of determining how 
people rise to that inferential challenge. Some have argued that the 
pragmatics of the situation turns this into an unfair task (Vanderhenst, Rossi, 
& Schroyens, 2002): Why would the experimenter provide the initial triple ‘2-4-
6’ if it was not informative? Yet, there are many instances in the history of 
science where the naïve interpretation of natural phenomena prevents the 
development of the correct explanation—heliocentrism for example. In other 
words, nature is indifferent to the untutored mind. But we’re straying: There 
are other features of the 2-4-6 task that make it less representative of 
hypothesis testing outside the laboratory, namely the restricted level of 
interactivity with artefacts and the resulting representational poverty of the 
triple sequences.  
Rule discovery is a form of inductive inference, and as such, there exists 
no method that can guarantee the truth of an inference, however much 
adduced evidence appears to support it. In turn, participants may announce 
the correct rule on the basis of the flimsiest of evidence. Predictors of 
discovery in this task include (i) hard work, as measured by the number of 
sequences generated before announcing a rule, and (ii) creativity, as 
measured by the breadth of the number sequences generated, including 
descending sequences, sequences that go up in variable increments (e.g., ‘2-
4-13’; Vallée-Tourangeau, Austin, & Rankin, 1995). Hard work and creativity 
help participants produce a more representative sample of number 
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sequences, from which they are more likely to infer the correct rule. But there 
is no guarantee: the mechanics of inferential reasoning are laced with 
uncertainty.  
Hard work and creativity seem like the perfect examples of individual, 
dispositional, factors. Some work harder, some are a more creative, and 
these individuals are more likely to succeed; ergo, a successful psychology of 
rule discovery must understand hard working and creative people. Wason’s 
initial characterization of the lucky 20% who solved the task was in terms of 
these people’s “disposition to refute” (1960, p. 139). The implicit call to arms 
with this conclusion is for psychologists to determine what individual 
differences—in terms of cognitive or psychological dispositions—could explain 
a participant’s ability to infer the correct rule. These dispositions vary across 
people, and hence some are more likely to succeed than others. Such 
dispositional conjectures, however, deflect researchers’ attention away from 
factors external to participants, that is away from the context—literally the 
physical context—of reasoning.  
There is also considerably more explanatory upside for cognitive 
psychologists in exploring features of the context of reasoning, features that 
are external to the reasoner, than to keep the context of reasoning constant—
i.e., to maintain the same experimental procedure—but hunt for the minority of 
participants who can solve the problem. On the one hand, keeping the context 
of reasoning constant implicitly endorses the representativeness of that 
context; using the same procedure across experimental demonstrations 
assumes that it provides a representative window onto the cognitive 
processes that are essential to perform the task. On the other hand, there is a 
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form of cognitive elitism in letting individual differences determine cognitive 
performance on the task. The majority who can’t crack the problem is cast 
aside as a relatively uninformative source of data, and the research efforts 
target the minority who outperforms.  
Diagrams. A powerful way to elevate performance in the 2-4-6 task is to 
offer a diagrammatic representation of the number sequences as participants 
produce them. Vallée-Tourangeau and Payton (2008) designed a 2-4-6 task 
isomorph wherein participants produced new sequences by entering number 
in a bespoke Excel spreadsheet that simultaneously plotted the resulting 
pattern produced by the number sequence. As participants tested sequences 
such as ‘6-8-10’ (Fig 1a.), ‘6-12-10’ (Fig 1b.) or ‘1-5-13’ (Fig 1c.), they also 
generated diagrammatic representations of the sequence.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Compared to a group who used a similar computer-based interface but 
one that did not synchronously produce a diagrammatic representation of the 
numbers, participants were twice more likely to announce the correct ‘any 
ascending sequence’ rule. Diagrammatic representations supported discovery 
by offering reasoners multiple representations of the same information, as 
well as the opportunity to switch from one medium to the other if stuck along 
an unproductive line of reasoning. Second, diagrammatic representations 
afforded perceptual inferences that may not be constrained by the arithmetic 
affordances of the initial triple ‘2-4-6’ (e.g., its features suggest a formulaic 
progression). Indeed, participants who solved the task in the diagrammatic 
representation group were less likely to formulate algebraically specific 
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hypotheses than participants who completed the task without the visual 
diagrams. And transcending the specific rules implicit to the initial triple is key: 
the diagrams encouraged more qualitative descriptions of the number 
sequences tested. Third, the interface afforded interactivity. That is as 
participants entered or deleted a number in the creation of a new triple, the 
graphical display would be updated synchronously. The immediate visual 
feedback cued actions and likely guided the subsequent selection of numbers. 
The agent and the interface are more tightly linked, configuring a dynamic 
system that produces new triples. This dynamic coupling transforms the agent 
and the nature of the triple generation process. The immediate and 
synchronous feedback may have favored triple production that emerged from 
unmediated action-perception loops. The hypothesis-testing narrative 
articulated by the participants as they formulate their next hypothesis may be 
the product rather than the cause of this triple generation process.  
Thus, a modification of the context of reasoning substantially enhanced 
people’s inductive inference abilities in a task that is otherwise very difficult, 
solved by a minority of participants. By deflecting attention from the nature of 
the participants to the nature of the context of reasoning, researchers are able 
to understand the circumstances in which people reason better. A better 
understanding of the context of reasoning alerts the social scientist, educator, 
ergonomist, among others, of the intervention opportunities to create a 
felicitous environment that supports sounder inferences.  
Mental Set and Insight 
The influential Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer (1959) offered a 
broad taxonomy of thinking into reproductive and productive types. The 
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former reflects the application of well-rehearsed routine to the solution of 
problems. The latter is less anchored in past experiences, hence more 
‘creative’, the kind of thinking that kindles genuine insight (insight is a state of 
knowledge, not a process; Dominowski & Dallob, 1995). Abraham Luchins, a 
Wertheimer student and one-time research assistant, developed and tested a 
procedure to measure the extent and impact of reproductive or ‘mechanized’ 
thinking with a simple volume measurement task involving three jars 
containing different volumes of liquid. In this task, participants are required to 
obtain an exact quantity of liquid, which does not correspond to the volume of 
any of the three jars (Luchins, 1942). Rather, they must engage in various 
pouring and discarding maneuvers to obtain the right amount. In the typical 
set up, participants are given a medium size jar (A), a large jar (B) and a small 
jar (C). Thus a problem might be: assume jar A contains 21 units, B 127 units, 
and C 3 units, obtain exactly 100 units of liquid. This would require filling up 
jar B (127), and from B pouring liquid to fill A (127 - 21 = 106), and from the 
remaining liquid in B, filling C once (106 – 3 = 103), discarding the liquid from 
C, and then repeating the maneuver, hence 106 – 2(3) = 100. In other words, 
the solution to this problem is B - A - 2C. 
Luchins (1942) constructed a series of problem wherein the first five 
could be solved with the rule B – A – 2C; he called those training or 
einstellung problems (einstellung for latent expectation). Most participants 
learn the rule and when the fifth problem is presented, readily apply it. The 
next five problems are the interesting ones: they offer a window on the 
‘mechanization of thought’ (the title of Luchins’s original monograph). 
Problems 6 and 7 can be solved with the B-A-2C rule, but can also be solved 
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with a simpler A-C or A+C rule (e.g., obtain 20 units with A = 23, B = 49, and 
C = 3; the B-A-2C rule produces the right amount, but so does A-C). 
Participants who have not been trained with the first five problems, readily see 
the simple A-C solution; however participants who learned to solve the 
previous five problems continue using the more complicated algorithm. 
Problem 8 is particularly interesting: termed the ‘set breaker’, this problem can 
only be solved using the A-C rule, the complicated algorithm does not yield 
the right answer. Luchins’s spectacular finding was that the majority of his 
participants—and he tested a very wide variety of participants over countless 
replications of the effect—did not solve the set breaker problem although 
those who had not been exposed to the training problems could readily do so. 
Problems 9 and 10 were similar to the 6 and 7 in that they could be solved 
with the simple or more complicated algorithm. No matter their experience 
with the set breaker problem, participants continued using the B-A-2C rule for 
the last two problems.  
Mental set, or the Einstellung effect, is a very robust phenomenon. A 
number of explanations have been put forward (e.g, Jensen, 1960; Bilalić, 
McLeod, & Gobet, 2008) essentially in terms of a schema acquired during 
training with the initial set of five problems, that is reliably activated by the 
unchanging configuration of the next five; the activated schema triggers the 
learned operators that are applied to solve the problem. The schema exerts 
control over the participants’ behavior. 
The traditional methodological commitments to sequestering and 
individualism are particularly striking in the work on Einstellung: Luchins and 
those who studied the einstellung effect after him present this task to 
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participants as a series of pen and paper arithmetic problems. The implied 
wetness in the description of the water jar task above in terms of filing, 
pouring and discarding maneuvers was strictly figurative: People never 
interacted with jars and water in the typical set up (there are interesting 
exceptions described in Vallée-Tourangeau, Euden, & Hearn, 2011). Contrast 
this with a situation where each of the water jar problems were presented in 
the same order—five training problems followed by five critical or test 
problems—but each presented to participants in terms of three actual jars of 
varying size next to a sink. In addition, participants are not provided with pen 
and paper, and instead must determine the target amount of liquid by literally 
performing filling and pouring maneuvers. For a start, without pen and paper 
the well-schooled arithmetic reflex is defused. The thinking ecology without 
pen and paper then may naturally encourage a different way of thinking about 
the problem. Certainly, the nature of the interaction with the artefacts is 
predicated on a completely different range or perceptual and motor 
information and possibilities. The schematic control over behavior during the 
test phase with the traditional procedure may be overcome by action-
perception loops guided and constrained by the artefacts facing the 
participants. In the series of experiments reported in Vallée-Tourangeau et al. 
(2011), this is exactly what was observed. When participants were confronted 
with real jars at a sink, but with the identical series of Luchins’s water jar 
problems, they readily acquired the complex pouring sequence during the 
training problems, corresponding to the B-A-2C rule, but were significantly 
more likely to opt for simpler pouring maneuvers for the test problems; they 
were also significantly more likely to solve problem 8—the extinction 
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problem—than control participants who completed the task using pen and 
paper. Thus Luchins’s celebrated window onto reproductive problem solving 
and the mechanization of thought is a procedural spandrel that reflects a 
deeply entrenched commitment to a model of thinking as disembodied 
abstract computation. In the wet version of Luchins’s task, the system 
configured in terms of agent, jars, tap and sink, interlinked by action- 
perception loops, fosters much more efficient performance. If behaviour in the 
traditional version of the Luchins task is understood to reflect the influence of 
a problem solving schema acquired during the learning phase and triggered 
by the similarity with the test problems, control over behaviour in the 
interactive version is distributed among features of the entire system. 
Participants are in a better position to exploit efficiencies in the environment 
by directly recognizing the affordances of the concrete artefacts. The 
ecosystem instantiated with the real jars involves hand movements adjusted 
and guided by dynamic action-perception loops, and the basic perceptual 
features of the environment exerts a greater control over the agent than in the 
traditional low interactivity abstract version of the water jar task. In this 
ecosystem, problem solving traces a spatio-temporal trajectory evidenced by 
the changes in the agent-environment configuration. The cognitive psychology 
of problem solving must characterize the system, the agent embedded in it 
and the transformative coupling that uniquely enacts both.  
Insight Problem Solving. Transformation or analytic problems have not 
exercised cognitive psychologists as much as so-called ‘insight’ or ‘non-
routine’ (Mayer, 1995) problems. The solution to an insight problem poses an 
interesting empirical and theoretical challenge because the solution appears 
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not to reflect the gradual transformation of proto solutions into a fully-fledged 
answer, but rather emerges with a certain velocity and clarity after much effort 
to overcome an impasse. Theoretical efforts from a number of different 
perspectives (Segal, 2004; Ohlsson, 1992; Fleck & Weisberg, 2013) converge 
on the importance of the initial problem representation and how that 
representation is restructured to offer the solution to the problem. Thus insight 
problems—as created under laboratory conditions—are designed to 
encourage a misleading initial interpretation of the problem, which must be 
abandoned and restructured into one that prompts the right operators to yield 
the solution (see Fig. 2 for a classic example). 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The cognitive psychologist’s deep commitment to intracranialism could 
not be clearer: “Representation occurs when a problem solver builds an 
internal mental representation of a problem that suggests a plan or a solution; 
solution occurs when a problem solver carries out a solution plan” (Mayer, 
1995, p. 4, emphasis in the original). In other words, the world is represented; 
internal computational processes transform this representation; each 
representational state cues operators that further transform the representation 
until it spawns a mental plan of action, which then governs problem solving 
behavior. The psychology of reasoning thus aims to characterise a pure 
computational process, classically decoupled from a physical environment 
that instantiates it. A series of figures in Ohlsson’s (2011) recent book Deep 
learning (Figs. 4.2-4.4 pp. 96-110) illustrates the conjectured processes by 
which activation among nodes that represent perceptual or semantic features 
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of a problem is re-distributed as a result of negative feedback, that is when an 
impasse is experienced. The outside world is a source of information to be 
sure, but in classical information-processing terms, the science begins when 
the world is represented. An important methodological—and ultimately 
theoretical—consequence of this commitment to such a strong thinking-is-in-
the-head position is an indifference, or partial blindness, to interactive sense-
making activities, to problem representations that are distributed and that 
emerge from action- perception loops, which, in turn, shape and re-shape the 
environment to support problem solving behavior.  
This is particularly clearly illustrated in the methodology employed by 
Fleck and Weisberg (2013) in their recent paper that offers a general 
theoretical framework of problem solving. The authors selected five insight-
like problems and trained participants to provide verbal protocols as they 
laboured to find a solution. Remarkably, two of the problems were text-based 
problems, and three were presented with manipulable artefacts. The fact that 
some problems fostered interactivity and the dynamic reshaping of the 
problem presentation failed to exercise the authors at all (a similar 
methodological indifference is found in the series of problems selected in the 
Gilhooly and Fioratou’s [2009] study on the role of working memory in 
problem solving). However, there is much evidence in Fleck and Weisberg’s 
paper that restructuring is much more likely in high interactivity contexts. For 
example, from the information in their Table 2 (p. 450), across successful and 
unsuccessful problem solvers, 67% of the participants restructured their 
representation when working on the problems with artefacts, but only 18% did 
so for the problems without the artefacts. If one only looks at the successful 
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participants, the presence of artefacts lead to a greater number of solutions 
through restructuring. Yet, Fleck and Weisberg (2013) never comment on 
these patterns in their data, and never address the main driver of 
restructuring, namely interactivity (see Vallée-Tourangeau, under review, for a 
more detailed analysis of the theoretical framework and the data reported in 
Fleck & Weisberg, 2013). 
A distributed problem representation is structured and restructured along 
a contingent temporal and spatial path. An emergent distributed 
representation reflects the dynamic transactional coupling of an agent’s 
mental space (cf. Malafouris, 2013, p. 101) and the shape of the physical 
environment in which she is embedded. As an example, imagine she is given 
7 letter tiles—e.g., L, N, A, O, I, T, E (Maglio et al., 1999)—and asked to 
generate a 7-letter world. She could be an anagram maven and spurt out a 7-
letter specimen through sheer mental zip. Most likely, however, she will start 
moving the tiles, re-arranging their order, experimenting with different stems 
and morphemes. The production of a new word lies in the intertwining of the 
agent’s proto-hunches and the letter strings offered by the environment. Her 
actions need not be guided by a fully articulated plan, or indeed any plan at all 
(e.g., she could be playing with the tiles). She doesn’t yet know what she is 
after: her representation of the candidate word is partial and incomplete, 
tethered to the letter string that she’s just re-arranged. Her actions will exploit 
certain environmental affordances (e.g., in the form of certain letter strings, 
certain physical juxtapositions), themselves contingent on previous letter tile 
movements. She first generates T O N A L, and with a few additional 
movements she anticipates the possibility of T O E N A I L; the solution to her 
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problem is thus distilled by interactivity. This simple illustration highlights an 
important methodological challenge: To understand insight, research should 
focus on the dynamic transformation of the agent’s mental space in tandem 
with the transformation of the external environment. For this to happen, 
though, the research procedure employed must permit and encourage 
interactivity and a malleable problem presentation that can be transformed 
through an agent’s action. 
Interactivity. A well-known productive thinking task, initially developed 
by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider and Rhenius (1999; see also Van Stockum & 
DeCaro, 2013) involves matchstick arithmetic with Roman numerals. The 
participants are presented with a false expression such as ‘II = II + II’ and are 
invited to turn it into a true one by moving only one matchstick. In this 
particular example, the operator ‘+’ can be transformed into the operator ‘-‘ 
and the additional ‘stick’ can be added to the numeral 2 to turn it into a 3 (viz. 
II = III – II). This is a productive thinking task because there is no well learned 
routine that can be applied to discover the solution. Knoblich et al. (1999) 
report the solution rates of different matchstick problems varying in difficulty. 
In this, and subsequent experiments (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001) 
the experimental procedure makes sense only from a deeply entrenched 
commitment to an internalist-classical-computational view of cognition: The 
problems don’t actually involve matchsticks as such; the arithmetic 
expressions are presented on a computer screen and participants announce 
their proposed solution to an experimenter. In their subsequent eye-tracking 
study, Knoblich et al. (2001) had participants place a ‘bite bar’ in their mouth 
to “increase the precision of the measurement by stabilizing the participants’ 
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head” (p. 1003). Thus, participants stared at an unmodifiable display. 
Whatever mentally simulated transformation, the perceptual feedback remains 
the same and considerable attentional resources must be deployed to 
maintain the simulated transformation in mind despite the conflicting, 
unchanging, sensory experience. Thus the information in an unchanging 
display is much different from the information that emanates from the pliant 
and dynamic external world. Whatever may be said in favour of the window 
that such an experimental procedure opens onto problem solving activity as 
they naturally occur in the world outside the laboratory, the feature that 
undermines their ecological plausibility is the absence of flexibility. The world 
outside is plastic: it is kneadable, malleable, modifiable. Reasoners naturally 
transform the environment when thinking, or rather transforming the 
environment is thinking: Interactivity matters. Imagine the same task but with 
moveable matchsticks and participants free to move the matchsticks when 
‘thinking’. Moving a matchstick, whether on the basis of a plan of action or 
action cued by perceptual features of the environment, transforms the 
arithmetic expression, hence the perceptual feedback, and may alter the 
epistemic potential of the environment. Thus the proto-hypotheses that 
coalesce in the reader’s mind and the physical arithmetic expression are co- 
determined through action; the conscious explicit expression of a solution to 
the experimenter in this instance is a second order narrative primarily driven 
by first order action-perception loops. Moving the horizontal stick that 
composes the plus operator in the example above transforms the perceptual 
information as well as the reasoner’s proto-hunches; the dynamic perceptual 
information transforms the reasoner’s mental space, and both cue different 
SYSTEMIC PROBLEM SOLVING  19 
actions that bind this contingent transactional co-existence.  
Weller, Villejoubert and Vallée-Tourangeau (2011) designed an 
interactive version of the matchstick arithmetic task employed in Knoblich et 
al.: Participants were much more likely to solve the insight problems when 
given the opportunity to manipulate the matchsticks than when they looked at 
a static display of the problems. The behavior of participants in the low 
interactivity group was also interesting: they would touch the printed numerals 
or move their fingers across the printed arithmetic expression. Kirsh (1995) 
would call these movements complementary actions that helped participants 
simulate the matchstick movement in their mental space. In the interactive 
condition, however, participants could materialise these projections. A 
materialised projection can be manipulated and anchors new projections. 
Kirsh (2013) calls this the most fundamental feature of human cognition: 
“When we interact with our environment for epistemic reasons, we often 
interact to create scaffolds for thought, thought supports we can lean on. But 
we also create external elements that can actually serve as vehicles for 
thoughts. We use them as things to think with.” (p. 178). As the environment 
is modified, the perceptual feedback and action affordances are modified, 
cueing a different set of behavioural opportunities that further determine the 
spatio-temporal development of the agent-environment configuration. 
Engineering insight problem solving task where participants can modify the 
physical features of the problem presentation permits the qualitative and 
quantitative characterisation of such systemic dynamic configurations. 
Cognitive Ecosystems 
Representational effects are well understood and long appreciated by 
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cognitive psychologists. To adapt the ‘number scrabble’ game described in 
Simon’s (1996) The sciences of the artificial, imagine the Game of 15, where 
players take turn selecting numbers from 1 to 9; they do so without the 
support of pen or paper and with the goal of being first to string three numbers 
that sum to 15. In the absence of any artifacts and the possibility of projecting 
moves onto a grid of sorts (cf. Kirsh, 2009), the game quickly takes a toll on 
working memory. After a few turns, it is difficult for players to keep track of 
their own selections, all possible interim sums, not to mention the numbers 
chosen by their opponent: As a result the strategic number selection to block 
an opponent’s progress or guarantee a win becomes very difficult. However, if 
one can conjure up in working memory a magic square (as illustrated in Fig. 
3), where the sum of each row, column, and diagonal is 15, then the selection 
of numbers and the appreciation of which moves can draw or win the game is 
‘just’ like playing noughts and crosses (e.g., if player A has already selected 
‘4’ and ‘5’ then B must select ‘6’). Of course, the game of 15, for most people, 
is much harder to play than noughts and crosses, yet at one level of analysis, 
the game of 15 and noughts and crosses are isomorphic. This isomorphism 
encourages and reassures a strong internalist and computational explanation 
of behaviour. The bet is that the modeling efforts must be based on the deep 
abstract logical structure of the game. In other words, the fact that noughts 
and crosses is easier to play than the game of 15 is a secondary detail of 
implementation. However, the cognitive ecological realities can be very 
different across different instantiations of ‘isomorphic’ tasks. For example, 
across the two versions of the water jar volume measurement tasks (as 
discussed in the preceding section), the perceptual information, the tools and 
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artefacts, action affordances and proprioceptive feedback configure different 
cognitive ecosystems, which engage and constrain cognitive agents in very 
different ways.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Zhang and Norman (1994) offered an elegant demonstration of 
representational effects in an analytic problem-solving task. On the basis of a 
formal analysis of the manner with which key features of a problem can be 
physically realised in the artefacts employed to present the problem, they 
predicted how certain Tower of Hanoi problem isomorphs might be quicker 
and easier to complete. The measures and analyses of problem solving 
performance presented in Zhang and Norman (1994) however ignore a 
fundamental aspect of thinking, namely that it reflects the evolution of an 
agent-environment system configured through interactivity. Zhang and 
Norman measure the time and the number of moves needed to solve the 
various Tower of Hanoi isomorphs as a function of which rule(s) or 
dimension(s) were externally represented, but the actual trajectory enacted 
with these different isomorphs was never mentioned, measured, or analysed. 
In addition, by using an analytic problem with a very clear goal state and a 
small set of operators, participants knew what the solution looked like: they 
were not looking for a solution, they were looking for means to achieve it 
quickly with the fewest moves. In contrast, insight problems have goal states 
that initially appear irreconcilable with the given information and the operators 
needed to transform progressive approximations of the goal state are 
unknown. We have argued that insight is distilled through interactivity, and it’s 
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important for researchers to develop a research methodology to capture the 
contingent trajectory wrought by interactivity. 
The work reviewed in this paper stresses the importance of interactivity 
in enhancing reasoning and problem solving. However, the material 
presentation of a problem, the nature of the external resources recruited in the 
process of solving a problem, may also steer the thinking trajectory along 
unproductive paths; we have also observed this phenomenon in our work 
(Vallée-Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, & Makri, in preparation; 
Vallée-Tourangeau, under review). Complex systems can be unpredictable, 
and are susceptible to initial conditions. Unanticipated action affordances in 
the design of the artefacts in a problem solving experiment may encourage 
the reasoner to engage in unproductive behavior. We would argue, however, 
that these unproductive trajectories are also better understood from a 
systemic perspective that help researchers identify more precisely the nature 
of the external resources that best supports sound thinking. 
Different problem isomorphs instantiated with different sets of artefacts 
that afford certain action opportunities specify a certain cognitive ecosystem. 
Implicit, perhaps, to much of our discussion thus far, is the question of which 
of these different cognitive ecologies is the canonical one that offers the best 
window onto a particular feature of human reasoning. However, such a 
question assumes that there is a pure or true reasoning ability that can be 
unlocked with the right experimental key. It is probably wiser to assume that a 
constellation of lab-based cognitive ecologies can be loosely grouped 
together on the basis of how well they approximate cognitive ecologies 
outside the laboratory. In addition, a commitment to a systemic perspective on 
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reasoning undermines efforts to localize the proximate cause of reasoning 
performance in the cognitive agents themselves. The transactional forces that 
shape the different components of the cognitive ecosystem means that the 
system is ‘non-decomposable’ (Baber, Parekh, & Cengiz, 2014): No 
components of the cognitive ecosystem can be isolated and implicated 
independent of the other components that together configure the ecosystem 
(Steffensen, in press; Turvey & Shaw, 1999). 
In reviewing inductive reasoning and problem solving (of the 
reproductive and productive kind), we’ve sought to encourage researchers to 
examine carefully the agent-context coupling that defines the cognitive 
ecosystem in which a certain reasoning task is completed. This systemic 
perspective offers a much richer source of insights about human reasoning, 
and pays off handsomely in empirical, methodological and theoretical terms. 
Empirically, the perspective offers inexhaustible heuristic value in pushing 
researchers to tinker with the parameters of the agent-environment coupling 
and in the process, unveil a broader spectrum of problem solving behaviours 
and reasoning performance. Dispositional conjectures and commitments to 
individualism promote a cognitive elitism that constrains the ability to envisage 
and engineer transformative agent-context interfaces. Methodologically a 
systemic perspective naturally encourages critical reflections on the laboratory 
procedure designed to offer a window on some features of human cognition. 
Research paradigms fossilize through feasibility and replicability pressures 
and then through the narrow parametric tweaking of proposed explanatory 
models. Eventually, the original methodological decisions made by early 
researchers are black-boxed and unchallenged. Wason’s (1960) original 
SYSTEMIC PROBLEM SOLVING  24 
procedure has been employed repeatedly, each time demonstrating biased 
hypothesis testing behaviours that limit people’s ability to discover the rule. 
The replication of the phenomenon from such a narrow set of methodological 
parameters reflect the type of biased hypothesis testing that the task was 
designed to illustrate in the first instance.  
Theoretically, a systemic perspective invites researchers to rethink the 
nature of cognition, of representations, and the mechanisms that assemble a 
cognitive product (cf. Giere, 2006). Grand ontological pronouncements 
oblivious of the nature of the tasks faced by reasoners, the social and cultural 
dimensions of the system, and the different time scales over which cognition 
unfolds simply cannot accommodate the range and the dynamic ontogeny of 
the cognitive phenomena investigated by psychologists and social scientists. 
The cognitive products reviewed here—a problem representation, a 
hypothesis that describes sequences of numbers, or a solution to a problem—
can be better described in terms of a spatio-temporal trajectory enacted 
through agent-environment transactional couplings (Vallée-Tourangeau & 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). Along this trajectory, complexity and 
representational content snowball, and cognition evolves into a second order 
narrative of a sequence of first order action-perception loops. Ontological 
considerations must thus reflect ontogenic and scalar constraints. These 
theoretical considerations suggest that a productive way to proceed in the 
psychology of reasoning is to adopt a more qualitative description and 
analysis of participants’ behavior over time as they work on the problem (e.g., 
Steffensen, 2013). Such a shift from individual methodologism to systemic 
methodologism would leave researchers in a better position to document the 
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mutually transformative effect of interactivity as participants reshape the 
physical configuration of the problem constituents which in turn shape the 
distributed representation of the problem. 
In psychology experiments, researchers manipulate variables to study 
the relationships between specific events and their consequences. In 
cognitive psychology, a typical experiment involves the presentation of 
different verbal, iconic or auditory stimuli and measuring the effect of a 
change in stimulus on a behavioural response such as a reaction time or a 
performance level (cf. Järvilehto, 1998). The tool of choice for running 
experiments in many laboratories is a personal computer as they allow for 
precise control over the presentation and timing of stimuli and the responses 
measured. Another common tool is simply a paper-based questionnaire 
presenting the stimuli and asking participants to respond using a pencil. The 
apparatus used in these experiments, however, is likely to bias our 
understanding of what cognition is and how it works. The implicit limitation of 
both the computer-based or paper-based stimuli presentations is that they 
severely limit participants’ opportunities to handle the information presented to 
them. This may be seen as an asset for the experimentalist who has adopted 
an internalist perspective on cognition and, consequently, whose primary 
concern is to control for extraneous influences. From a systemicist’s 
perspective, however, this choice of apparatus offers but a limited cognitive 
ecosystem which imposes artificial limitations on the affordances available to 
the agent for performing the cognitive task at hand and, consequently, may 
offer a biased window onto the feats a reasoning agent can achieve and how 
she may achieve them. The alternative is to consider the affordances offered 
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by the tasks and consider using stimuli that can be manipulated or handled by 
the participants while they think, either by using actual artefacts in lieu of 
static verbal descriptions or interactive diagrams in lieu of static 
representations and interactive conversations in lieu of controlled auditory 
stimuli. For example, in Vallée-Tourangeau and Payton (2008), the interface 
afforded the active manipulation of the diagrammatic representation of the 
triplets generated. This, in turn, enabled participants to be actively engaged in 
a cycle of cognitive transactions between what they thought in their mind, 
what they did in the world, and what the world offered back. We believe that 
untethering participants and offering them the opportunity to think through 
their hands may have a transformative effect on our understanding of 
cognition. As the systemicist’s approach matures, this will allow researchers 
to gain a finer understanding of which types of affordances have the potential 
to transform cognition and how they may do so. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Three types of triples in the 2-4-6 task represented graphically 
as in Vallée-Tourangea and Payton (2008): (a) ‘6-8-10’; (b) ‘6-12-10’; (c) ‘1-5-
13’. 
Figure 2. A Max Wertheimer problem: Find the surface area of the figure 
composed of a parallelogram on top of a square. The initial problem 
representation (a) creates an impasse for most participants (see Segal, 2004). 
A restructuring of the representation in terms of overlapping triangles (b) and 
then into a rectangle (d) creates a much simpler problem that is more easily 
solved (Ohlsson, 1984). 
Figure 3. The game of 15: Winner is the first to pick three numbers that 
sum to 15. If player A's selected '4' and '5' then B must select '6'. The game is 
isomorphic with noughts and crosses. 
 
  


































































Figure 1. Three types of triples in the 2-4-6 task represented graphically as in Vallée-Tourangeau 
and Payton (2008): '6-8-10' (a); '6-12-10' (b); '1-5-13' (c).





Figure 2. A Max Wertheimer problem: Find the surface area of the figure composed of a 
parallelogram on top of a square. The initial problem representation (a) creates an impasse for 
most participants (see Segal, 2004). A restructuring of the representation in terms of overlapping 
triangles (b) and then into a rectangle (d) creates a much simpler problem that is more easily 
solved (Ohlsson, 1984). 
Max Wertheimer's square and parallelogram problem (in Ohlsson, 1984). The goal is to find the surface 
area of the two figures. A decomposition of the perceptual chunks that are formed from the initial problem 
representation (involving a parallelogram on top of a square) leads to a representation involving 
overlapping triangles which in turn leads to a representation of a much simple perceptual chunk: a 
rectangle.  
a b c d 
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Figure 3 
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